Western Analysts Urged to Reassess Chinese Nuclear Expansion Through the Lens of Allied Conventional Superiority

New research highlights how Western conventional military superiority is a primary driver of China’s nuclear expansion and regional strategic instability in 2026.

By: AXL Media

Published: Mar 28, 2026, 10:10 AM EDT

Source: Information for this report was sourced from The Diplomat

The Perception Gap in Global Nuclear Strategy

The current discourse surrounding the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal often fails to account for the defensive motivations perceived by the Chinese leadership. According to Dan Plesch and Manuel Galileo, the rapid growth in silo construction and warhead production is not merely an aggressive bid for hegemony but a reaction to external pressures. From the perspective of Beijing, the combined conventional military strength of the United States and its regional partners represents a credible threat to its secondary strike capabilities. This creates a cycle of escalation where Western efforts to maintain stability are viewed as existential threats by the Chinese military command.

The Weight of Allied Conventional Superiority

Western military power, characterized by advanced missile defense systems and high-precision conventional weapons, has significantly altered the traditional calculus of nuclear deterrence. As noted by Plesch, the ability of the U.S. and its allies to conduct devastating non-nuclear strikes against command centers and launch sites forces China to seek a larger nuclear cushion. This "conventional-nuclear nexus" means that as long as the West maintains a qualitative edge in traditional weaponry, Beijing will likely feel compelled to expand its strategic forces to ensure a credible deterrent remains. The sheer scale of allied naval and aerial dominance in the South China Sea further reinforces this sense of encirclement.

A Quest for Strategic Survivability

For the Chinese government, the primary goal of the recent nuclear build-up is the preservation of a "second-strike" capability that can survive an initial engagement. According to Galileo, the expansion of mobile missile units and hardened underground facilities is a tactical necessity in an environment where stealth and precision have rendered older systems obsolete. By diversifying its delivery methods, Beijing aims to ensure that even a massive conventional or limited nuclear strike could not fully disarm its strategic response. This focus on survivability suggests that Chinese policy remains rooted in a logic of deterrence rather than a desire for a first-strike advantage.